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Abstract
Informal groups cannot rely on external enforcement to insure that members abide by their
obligations. It is generally assumed that these problems are solved by ‘social sanctions’ and
reputational effects. The present paper focuses on roscas, one of the most commonly found
informal financial institutions in the developing world. We first show that, in the absence of
an external (social) sanctioning mechanism, roscas are never sustainable, even if the defecting
member is excluded from all future roscas. We then argue that the organizational structure of
the rosca itself can be designed so as to address enforcement issues. The implications of our
analysis are consistent with first-hand evidence from rosca groups in a Kenyan slum.
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1 Introduction
A substantial number of economic activities in developing countries are carried out by informal
groups. Their success has attracted much public attention and knowledge of these groups is of par-
ticular importance if we want to understand the potential role for more formal institutions. While
these groups may differ significantly in their organizational structures and functions (insurance,
savings, mutual credit, work cooperatives...), they all share in common that (i) participation in
these groups is voluntary, and (ii) they do not and cannot rely on external enforcements. However,
very little is known about the mechanisms used by these groups to ensure that members abide by
their obligations. In this paper we aim to explore enforcement issues that arise in informal saving
groups by considering the role played by the institutional design of these groups. More specifically,
we shall highlight the possible trade-offs between the social desirability of particular organizational
structures and their impact on the enforceability of the underlying arrangements. There is very
little literature pertaining directly to this issue. The paper closest in spirit to ours is the one by
Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994) who study the organizational design of credit cooperatives.
We focus on rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) which constitute one of the most
commonly found informal financial institutions in the developing world.1 Recent studies reveal
exceptionally high participation rates in these associations.2 For instance, from an original field
survey we carried out in a Kenyan slum, we find that 57.2% of households have at least one
individual who belongs to a rosca. The average monthly contribution into rosca groups is equal
to 20.3% of individual income and 13.6% of total household income (Anderson and Baland, 2002).
Although roscas are most common in very poor areas of the world, there are examples where they
exist along side more formal financial institutions and are sometimes preferred (see, for example,
Levenson and Besley (1996) for Taiwan, Eeckhout and Munshi (2003) for India). Roscas are also
popular amongst immigrant groups in both the United States and Britain.3
More specifically, a rosca is a group of individuals who gather for a series of regular meetings.
1See Bouman (1977), for a list of countries in parts of Africa, Asia, the Americas, Caribbean, Middle East, and
early Europe where roscas have appeared. The origins of roscas are unclear; records show that they have existed
since pre-modern times in China (Tsai 2000), 9th century in Japan (Miyanaga 1995), 1663 in Korea (Light and Deng
1995), and early 19th century in many parts of Africa (Ardener 1964).
2There is a large anthropological literature on roscas beginning with the work of Ardener (1964) and Geertz (1962).
3See, for example, Light and Deng (1995), Bonnett (1981), Kurtz (1973), Srinivasan (1995), Bouman (1995),
Summerfield (1995), and Besson (1995). There is also some evidence that roscas formed the basis of U.S. savings and
loans associations, see Besley (1995) for references.
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At each meeting, each person contributes a pre-determined amount into a collective ‘pot’ which is
then given to a single member. The latter is subsequently excluded from receiving the pot in future
meetings, while still being obliged to contribute to the pot. The meeting process repeats itself until
all members have had a turn at receiving the pot. Essentially, members take turns in benefitting
from collected savings. At the start of the scheme, the order of such turns must be decided either by
a lottery draw (henceforth referred to as a random rosca), or according to a predetermined pattern
(a fixed rosca) or by a bidding process. In the Kenyan context we studied, 71 percent of the roscas
are fixed while 29 percent are random (there are no bidding roscas).
In spite of their organizational simplicity, roscas do suffer from incentive problems. Because
of the rotational structure of roscas, the incentive for members who receive the pot earlier in the
cycle to default on their later contributions is high. Moreover, the incentives of the member who
receives the pot last to contribute to the pot are not at all clear. Although the issue of default is
acknowledged in almost any study of roscas, enforcement problems have not been directly addressed
in the previous literature.4
Since roscas are typically formed by a relatively small group of individuals who live in the
same area, it is generally assumed that the prospect of participating in future cycles of the rosca
as well as the threat of social sanctions by the other members of the group are enough to deter
opportunistic defection. Thus, Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) note that roscas “use pre-existing
social connections between individuals to help circumvent problems of imperfect information and
enforceability” (p. 805). Similarly, Handa and Kirton (1999) point out that “crucial to the success
of roscas is the social collateral that ensures sustainability” (p. 177). It has been discussed that
defaulters would not only be sanctioned socially but also prevented from further rosca participation.
Ardener (1964) explains that “the member who defaults in one association may suffer to such an
extent that he may not be accepted as a member of any other. In some communities, the rotating
credit institution has become so rooted in the economic and social system that exclusion would be
a serious deprivation” (p. 216).
While we will show that such social sanctions certainly have a role to play, we first demonstrate
that exclusion from all future roscas is not a sufficient deterrent to avoid default. We then argue
that, when social sanctions are weak, the institutional structure of roscas can be designed so as
4See, for example, van den Brink and Chavas (1997), Ardener (1964), and Kurtz (1973). Handa and Kirton (1999)
do provide and in depth study of the role of the rosca leader in explaining the sustainability of the group.
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to minimize enforcement problems. In particular, we shall focus on the way ranks are allocated
across members. It will be demonstrated that, while random roscas are preferred by a majority of
members, the enforcement problems are lower in fixed roscas.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model of rosca participation and
discusses the preferred allocation of ranks. We investigate the issue of enforcement in Section 3, and
explore how the institutional design of roscas can be modified to address enforcement problems.
In Section 4, we illustrate some of the implications of our theoretical analysis in the context of the
Kenyan slum we surveyed. Section 5 concludes.
2 A model of random versus fixed roscas
In this section, we develop a simple model of rosca participation. We consider two main motives
for rosca participation discussed in the literature. In their seminal contribution, Besley, Coate and
Loury (1993) argued that, on average, roscas allowed members to enjoy the benefits of the pot earlier
than if they were saving at home, since the allocation of pots begins at the first meetings. We shall
refer to this as the early pot motive. In Anderson and Baland (2002), we proposed another motive
where members join roscas to save at a higher savings rate than they would at home. We justified
this by focusing on the conflict over joint consumption and savings patterns between husbands and
wives, and explained that women join roscas to bind themselves to a particular saving pattern that
is different from their husbands. We shall refer to this as the household conflict motive.
Our aim here is to focus on enforcement issues. To this end, we shall investigate two main
questions. First, to what extent does the threat of exclusion from all future roscas help to discipline
rosca members? Second, how can the institutional design of the rosca be used to deter default?
In order to address these questions, we shall extend the seminal work of Besley, Coate, and Loury
(1993) to incorporate multiple rosca cycles.5 With regards to institutional features, we focus on the
allocation of ranks across members. There are essentially three possibilities: fixed order, random
order and bidding for ranks. Although the latter two have been the focus of previous literature, we
focus on the former two in the present analysis.6 This is justified by our data, where no bidding
5Although it is not their focus, Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) do discuss the issue of default and assume an
exogenous cost of defaulting which is large enough for members to continue contributing after receiving the pot. The
central difference here is that we explicitly consider the costs of default and model them in terms of exclusion from
future rosca cycles.
6See Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993 and 1994), Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999) who contrast random and bidding
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roscas are observed.7
2.1 The basic setting
As we are concerned with the possibility of future sanctions, we assume that individuals are infinitely
lived. Time is discrete, and the lifetime utility of an individual i is represented by:
U i(c,D) =
∞∑
t=1
δtui(ct, Dt) (1)
where D is the vector of all consumption flows of the indivisible good and Dt represents the
consumption at time t of one unit of the indivisible good which, once acquired, lasts for one unit of
time: Dt is equal to one if the good is purchased at time t and zero otherwise.8 Similarly, c is the
vector of all consumption expenditures on other goods, ct represents those expenditures at time t,
and δ < 1 is the discount factor.
The budget constraint in each period can be expressed as:
y = ct + st (2)
where y is the constant income per period and st is savings. Income is held constant so that the
only motive to save is to purchase the indivisible good, the cost of which is equal to P . If the
indivisible good is bought successively at times k and k + τ , then we have: P =
∑k+τ
t=k+1 st. We
assume that individuals have no access to credit markets so that st ≥ 0.
As discussed above, we allow for two different motives to join a rosca, the household conflict
motive and the early pot motive. The difference between these two motives can be simply modeled
as different reservation utilities when saving outside of the rosca. We first examine the optimal
saving plan under both of these motives in the absence of rosca participation.
Consider the early pot motive. Let (c∗,D∗) represent the optimal consumption flow which
maximizes U i(c,D), under the budget constraint (2), so that U i(c∗,D∗) denotes lifetime optimal
utility. We assume that there is a saving motive so that c∗t < y for all t 9.
roscas, Klonner (2002) and Eeckhout and Munshi (2003) for analyses of bidding roscas.
7It must however be emphasized that the enforcement problem of the first member to receive the pot in a bidding
rosca is very similar to the one we discuss below.
8This is a useful simplifying assumption in a repeated framework, since then current decisions are unaffected by
the past.
9Note that s∗t = y − c∗t is such that u′(c∗t ) = δu′(c∗t+1) when saving for one unit of the indivisible good.
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Now consider the household conflict motive. On its own, the household maximizes UH(c,D)
which is a weighted sum of the lifetime utility of the husbandm, Um(c,D), and his wife f, Uf (c,D):
UH(c,D) = βUm(c,D) + (1− β)Uf (c,D)
=
∞∑
t=1
δt(βum(ct, Dt) + (1− β)uf (ct, Dt)) (3)
=
∞∑
t=1
δtuH(ct, Dt) (4)
where uH(ct, Dt) = βum(ct, Dt) + (1− β)uf (ct, Dt), ct represents joint consumption expenditures
on other goods, and β the relative bargaining power of the husband in household decision-making.
The budget constraint of the household is similar to the budget constraint (2) above (where y
represents household income). Let UH(c∗,D∗) stand for the household lifetime optimal utility. As
in Anderson and Baland (2002), we assume that the wife has a larger preference for the indivisible
good, in contrast to her husband who prefers immediate consumption. In consequence, the saving
rate optimally chosen in each period by the household, sH∗t , is always smaller than her own optimal
saving rate, sf∗t .
2.2 Individual preferences over the allocation of the pot
In a rosca, n members contribute a predetermined amount P/n to the common pot at each meeting.
The pot, P , is given to one of them who then acquires one unit of the indivisible good. There is
only one meeting per period, and the time space between two meetings lasts one unit of time. As
a consequence, the duration of a full cycle is equal to the number of members, n.
Rosca contributions are constant and denoted sR = P/n. As a result, a rosca member’s expen-
ditures on other goods are ct = cR = y − sR for all t. Potentially, roscas can choose whether they
last only one cycle, or are repeated. However, given the structure of preferences assumed above,
there is always a motive to save, and hence, it is always worthwhile to repeat the rosca.10 This
is particularly true for the household conflict motive. In the following, we therefore consider that
roscas are always repeated.
There are two main ways in which the pot is allocated among members. On the one hand,
there are random roscas, where ranks are allocated with equal probabilities at the beginning of
10A formal proof would follow directly, though for rosca repetition to dominate joining a new rosca, one needs to
introduce some frictions, such as search or set-up costs.
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each cycle. In each cycle, every member has a probability 1/n of receiving a particular rank. The
expected utility for an individual, or for a couple, of joining a random rosca is:
E(Ukr (c,D)) =
∞∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) +
1
n
∞∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0))
which can be rewritten as:
E(Ukr (c,D)) =
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δ
1− δ
1
n
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
(5)
On the other hand, there are fixed roscas where the allocation of ranks remains unchanged
across cycles. This implies that each member receives the pot at regular intervals of n units of
time. In this situation, the utility of a member with rank g is given by:11
Ukg,f (c,D) =
∞∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) + (δg + δg+n + δg+2n...)
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
=
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δg
1− δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
(6)
We now compare those two methods of allocating the ranks. From an individual perspective,
whenever an individual or a household has a motive to save, so that c∗t < y, she can always find
a random rosca such that she is better off. This follows because an individual can choose a rosca
with sR equal to her minimum optimal savings and accumulate additional savings on her own,
thereby at least replicating her optimal consumption pattern under autarky, c∗. By doing this, an
individual enjoys the potential benefit of an early rank in the allocation of the pot in some cycle.
Note that the latter argument requires that individuals supplement their saving in the rosca with
some extra saving on their own. This implies that, once they receive the pot, they may not be in
a position to buy the indivisible good but have to wait to accumulate enough extra savings. In a
slightly different framework, Besley et al (1994) show that, if instantaneous utility is separable in
(ct, Dt), the constant saving rate implemented by the rosca may correspond to the optimal saving
pattern under autarky. As it greatly simplifies our discussion, in this paper, we also assume that
individuals do not supplement the pot with extra individual savings, so that the pot covers the
total cost of the indivisible good.12
11The initial allocation of ranks is discussed later in more detail.
12In their model, each unit of the indivisible good provides a constant and infinite flow of services, which allows
Besley et al (1994) to assume away discounting while still preserving the desire to consume the indivisible good earlier.
In the present model, assuming away discounting would imply that no preference is given for earlier consumption of
the indivisible good, which would be unsatisfactory.
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For fixed order roscas, the above argument holds if the individual is given an early rank. With a
later rank, rosca participation may not yield positive benefits. Thus, if a member is last to receive
the pot, he is worse off than under autarky since the rosca implies a sub-optimal saving pattern.
Under the household conflict motive, rosca participation is also a tool that is used by wives to
bring the household saving pattern closer to a level she prefers. Once her husband realizes that
she has committed to a particular rosca, it is too late. (In the next section, we shall examine more
precisely what this notion of commitment implies.). Thus, under this motive, a woman always has
an interest in joining a rosca, as long as it involves a contribution that is higher than the average
saving rate in the household and closer to her preferred one.13
Clearly, members who know that they will be given a low rank in fixed rosca would prefer
to join a random rosca. Ex ante, however, if the initial allocation of ranks in the fixed rosca is
drawn randomly, so that each member has a probability 1/n to obtain a fixed rank that he keeps
throughout the cycles, individuals are indifferent between the two types of roscas. Using equations
(5) and (6), one can easily show that, under this situation, the expected utility from joining a
fixed or a random rosca are identical.14 If the allocation of initial ranks for the fixed rosca is not
uniformly random, members who are more likely to be given a favorable rank prefer a fixed order
rosca while those given a less favorable lottery prefer the random rosca.
2.3 Collective preferences over the allocation of the pot
We now investigate collective preferences over the allocation of the ranks. Consider the following
repeated stages
• Before the cycle starts, the group holds a meeting and, by majority rule, it decides whether
to have a random or a fixed rosca.
• The cycle starts and the pot is allocated to each member according to the rule.
• The cycle ends, and the group holds a meeting again and decides the allocation of ranks in
13More generally, roscas are preferred under a forced saving motive, where individuals bind themselves to a partic-
ular saving pattern that they cannot achieve under autarky (see Gugerty (2007) and Ambec and Treich (2007))
14Note also that a simple lottery whereby each member has a probability 1
n
of receiving the pot at each period
brings the same level of ex ante utility. We do not explicitly analyze this alternative arrangement as (i) we do not
observe this in our data set, and (ii) in a more general setting where individuals need a certain amount of cumulated
savings at regular intervals, risk aversion reduces its attractiveness (see Section 3).
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the subsequent cycle. In other words, it decides whether to maintain the ranks that were
given in the previous cycle or to reallocate them randomly across all members.
• A new cycle starts and so on.
There are conflicting interests in the allocation of the ranks as members with an early rank
prefer to keep their ranks in future cycles, while members with a late rank would prefer ranks to
be redrawn. We have:
Proposition 1 At the beginning of each cycle, a majority of members strictly prefers the random
to the fixed allocation of ranks.
Proof: At the beginning of a cycle, the expected utility over the cycle for member k of a random
allocation, where each member has exactly 1/n chances of getting a particular rank, is given by:
W kr =
n∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) +
1
n
n∑
t=1
δt(uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)),
while the utility for the same member with fixed rank g is given by
W kg,f =
n∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) + δg
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
.
Comparing these two expressions, one gets:
W kg,f < W
k
r ⇐⇒ δg
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
<
1
n
n∑
t=1
δt(uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0))
⇐⇒ δg < 1
n
n∑
t=1
δt
which, with δ < 1 and n ≥ 2, holds true for all g ≥ n+12 . This is due to the fact that δt is a convex
function of t, and implies that a majority of members strictly prefer a uniformly random allocation
of ranks to any given fixed allocation. 
This result follows directly from the way multiplicative discounting operates, that is, the dis-
counted value gets smaller at a decreasing rate with time. The corresponding discounted utility
levels associated with various ranks are illustrated in Figure 1 below. As can be seen, the average
of the discounted values at different points in time, point A in the figure, is always greater than the
discounted value at the average of these points in time (i.e., median rank), point B. As a result,
the member with the median rank strictly prefers the random to the fixed order rosca.
9
Our emphasis on discount rates is reasonable in a context of destitution and poverty. Indeed,
from the field survey we carried out on informal groups in Kenya (see section 4), the median monthly
interest rate paid on fully collaterized loans is as high as 20 percent. Consider a hypothetical rosca
of 17 members who gather every two weeks (these figures correspond to the average characteristics
of the roscas we surveyed). Assuming that the discount rate over two weeks is equal to 10 percent
and that the value of the pot for the first member is 1, it is easy to show that the discounted value
of the pot for the last member, after 34 weeks, is as low as 0.185. Comparing roscas, we find that 10
members strictly prefer the random while 7 members prefer the fixed rosca. If the pot is randomly
allocated, its expected value for each member is equal to 0.491. In comparison, the value of the
pot for the median ranked member is equal to 0.430. On average, the present value of the pot
for those who prefer the random rosca is as low as 0.310, much below that of the 7 members who
benefit from an early rank (the average value for them is equal to 0.749). For the disadvantaged
members, the switch to a random allocation of ranks thus increase expected benefits by 58 percent
on average. In comparison, if we considered a discount rate of 5 percent every two weeks, the gain
for those members from changing the allocation of ranks would be equal to 26 percent (from 0.540,
the average discounted value of the pot for these members in the fixed rosca, to 0.683, the expected
value of a random allocation of ranks).
While not modeled here, the preference for random over fixed roscas should also hold (and
perhaps be even stronger) with hyperbolic discounting, while it is independent of the degree of
risk aversion.15 The proposition has important implications since fixed roscas, as a collective
arrangement, are not time consistent under the majority rule. At the meeting preceding each cycle,
a majority of members prefer randomly drawing new ranks for all members instead of maintaining
the allocation of ranks prevailing in the previous cycle. By contrast, random roscas are time-
consistent in the sense that a majority of members would always vote in favor of random ranks at
the beginning of every cycle.
It is worth noting that the argument also extends within the cycle: among the members who
have not yet received the pot, a majority is in favor of randomly drawing the remaining ranks
instead of keeping the order determined at the beginning of the cycle. The most time consistent
15The result mainly follows from the assumption of time-seperable preferences. In a more general setting, the
preference for random over fixed roscas will depend on the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and the degree of
risk aversion, as we have demonstrated in a previous version of this paper.
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structure is therefore one in which, at each period within a cycle, the winner of the pot is drawn
randomly among those who have not yet received it. In this setting, members only learn their rank
when they receive the pot but remain identical before receiving it. Unfortunately, the information
we gathered on roscas in Kenya is not precise enough to distinguish between roscas which randomize
at the beginning of each cycle and those which randomize at each distribution of the pot, so that
we are not able to pursue this line of enquiry in this paper. It is however likely that a random
allocation of ranks at every period involves larger organizational costs at the group (e.g. by requiring
group meetings at every period or close monitoring of rank revelation within a cycle) and lowers
predictability at the individual level (making the planning of expenditures within a cycle more
difficult). 16
Finally, it is worth noting that, ex post, the distribution of lifetime utilities is more unequal
under a fixed than under a random rosca. Among all possible allocation of ranks across cycles, the
fixed allocation is the one leading to the most unequal distribution of welfare, with the first (last)
ranked member always being the first (last) to receive the pot in all cycles. In a collective decision
process in which the group cares not only about the ex ante but also the ex post distribution of
utilities across members, the group should prefer random roscas as leading to a more egalitarian ex
post outcome.17 From informal discussions with rosca members, it indeed appeared that a situation
in which one member keeps an unfavorable rank across all cycles was perceived as unfair (ex post).
Given this, the existence of fixed roscas is hard to justify on the basis of the individual or collective
preferences. In the next section, we discuss the extent to which fixed roscas may have a role in
disciplining members and solving enforcement problems.
3 Enforcement
As an informal group, a rosca cannot legally enforce agreements between members. As discussed
in the introduction, roscas can inflict two types of sanctions on defecting members. First, they can
exclude the member from all future roscas and, as we shall assume throughout, from all other rosca
groups as well. We refer to this as exclusion. Second, roscas can also punish defection via a range of
16However, as will be clear from the discussion in the next section, the enforcement properties of those two types
of random roscas are identical.
17We are grateful to one of the editors for pointing that out to us. This argument is directly related to the literature
on ex post considerations in welfare economics of uncertainty (see, e.g., Hammond (1981), Meyer and Mookherjee
(1987) and Ray and Ueda (1996)).
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social sanctions such as giving a bad reputation, retaliating at the workplace, or damaging personal
property. We refer to this set simply as social sanction. Let σk represent the cost to individual
(or household) of the social sanction that the group can impose on them if they defect. Clearly,
σk depends on a number of individual (household) characteristics which make one more vulnerable
to these sanctions, that we shall discuss in Section 4. We assume that these characteristics are
perfectly observable.
In the previous literature, it has been assumed that σk is sufficiently large to solve all enforce-
ment problems, so that the role played by the organizational structure of roscas has remained
largely ignored. Here, we analyze in more detail the role of social sanctions, and their inter-relation
with the design of the rosca. As a starting point, we first consider that no social sanctions can be
inflicted on their members, i.e. σk = 0, so that only exclusion can be employed against defecting
members. The first institutional feature we examine is the repeated structure of roscas. Thereafter,
we consider the allocation of ranks.
3.1 Enforcement through exclusion
Under the household conflict motive, it is precisely the strength of social sanctions that allows the
wife to commit her household to a rosca. In the absence of social sanctions, the household would
in fact refuse to pay the first contribution, as it does not correspond to its optimal saving. As a
result, the wife’s desire to join the rosca would be jeopardized, as the other members would realize
that her intentions are futile. Typically, exclusion from all future roscas cannot be used as a threat
since the household would be better off not participating at all. Thus, in the absence of social
sanctions, the household always leaves the rosca.18
We now turn to the early pot motive. Although it is not their focus, Besley, Coate and Loury
(1993) discuss the issue of default when considering the possibility that, having received the pot,
a member stops contributing. In their one-cycle framework, they assume an exogenous cost of
defaulting which is large enough to induce members to remain in the rosca.19 As they note, in
18It must be noted here that, while we focus on the household conflict motive in the exposition, all of the arguments
made also apply to any forced saving motive, where a rosca is used as a means to save more than one would on their
own (see in particular Gugherty (2007) and Anderson and Baland (2002)).
19“This cost might represent the discomfort, loss of face, and other social costs associated with having to confront
the other Rosca members each day or, in the extreme, the costs of finding a new job or place to live. In a more
general setting, it might also represent the loss from being excluded from Rosca participation in the future” (Besley,
Coate and Loury (1993), p. 806).
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repeated roscas, there is the possibility of punishing a member by excluding him from all future
cycles. The question that naturally arises is to what extent such a threat is in itself sufficient to
guarantee that members obey their obligations. Consider a member who obtains the pot in the
first meeting. When receiving the pot, she compares what she would gain by leaving the rosca and
being excluded from all future cycles, and saving on her own forever, to what she would gain from
staying in the group and fulfilling her obligations. We show in the proposition below that, for both
random and fixed roscas, the net gain from leaving the rosca is always strictly positive.
Proposition 2 In the absence of social sanctions, roscas are not sustainable. The member who is
the first to receive the pot is always tempted to leave and defect, even if she is excluded from all
future cycles.
Proof in Appendix A
In the absence of social sanctions, when a member is the first to receive the pot, she can always
do better by leaving the group and saving on her own in order to acquire additional units of the
indivisible good, compared to remaining in the rosca. The intuition for this result follows from the
fact that the first receiver is at least always able to replicate the best she can hope for in a rosca by
saving on her own. Therefore, exclusion from all future roscas groups is not a sufficient deterrent
of defection.20
3.2 Enforcement through the allocation of ranks
In the preceding discussion, we have focused on a particular enforcement problem where a rosca
member, upon receiving the pot, is tempted to leave the rosca and cease paying contributions before
the end of the cycle. Roscas, however, may also suffer from a second enforcement problem: the
temptation of those members who receive an unfavorable rank to leave the rosca before undertaking
any payment at all to the common pot. Clearly, the first enforcement problem is most severe for
the member who receives the first rank, while this second enforcement problem is more likely to
arise for the member with the last rank.
20The argument a fortiori holds when roscas have a limited, possibly uncertain, lifetime, as this only reduces the
future benefits from staying in the rosca. This result is reminiscent of a finding in a very different literature on
sovereign debt, where Bulow and Rogoff (1989) find that future exclusion from borrowing is not a sufficient threat
to sustain lending to small countries.
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The first part of Proposition 3 states that incentives in fixed roscas are identical among all
members: indeed, after receiving the pot, the first ranked member is in the exact same position as
the last ranked member as he has to wait a full cycle before receiving a new pot. By contrast, in
a random roscas, the enforcement problem for the first member to receive the pot is more severe,
as future ranks are identical across all members. This explains why we focus on the enforcement
problem of the first individual. Comparing his enforcement constraint across the two types of
roscas, we find that the first member to receive the pot has a lower incentive to default in a fixed
than in a random rosca:
Proposition 3 In a random rosca, the enforcement problems of the first member to receive the pot
are always more severe than those of the last member. In a fixed rosca, the enforcement problems
are identical across members of different ranks. Moerover, enforcement problems are more severe
in a random than in a fixed rosca.
Proof in Appendix A
To address the enforcement problem, rosca members can therefore choose to adopt a fixed
allocation of ranks. Fixed order roscas are indeed more favorable to the member who received
the first rank in the initial cycle, as she is then assured to retain her favorable position in all
subsequent cycles. In a random rosca, the first ranked member in a given cycle is uncertain about
his rank in the next cycle: in particular, the probability that he receives the pot in the first period
of that cycle is only 1/n. The non-randomness of fixed roscas therefore reduces the enforcement
problem for the first ranked member, who is then less tempted to leave and save on her own.
By contrast, the adoption of a fixed allocation of ranks hurts the last ranked member, whereas a
random allocation enables her to anticipate a better rank in the future. However, as we have seen
above, the enforcement problem is less severe for those members.
Three points need to be made here. First, the immediate payment of a first contribution before
ranks are announced reduces the enforcement issue of the last ranked member, as a payment has
already been made and would be lost in case of defection. By contrast it leaves the incentives of
the first ranked member unaffected. Such a possibility therefore increases the enforcement problem
of the first member compared to the last one, so that they are no longer equivalent in a fixed rosca.
Second, the enforcement issue of the last ranked individual can also be reduced if only one rank
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is drawn at each allocation of the pot, so that a member knows her rank only when she receives
the pot and the members who have not yet received it do not know when they will obtain it in
the remaining cycle. Such a scheme however leaves once again the incentive problem of the first
ranked member unchanged. Finally, there are two other possible ways to reduce the enforcement
problem. The first one is to drop the strict sequentiality of the rosca and instead resort to a lottery
system at each period, so that the first player has a positive probability of receiving the pot before
all members received it. While such a lottery system certainly improves the enforcement problem
of the first ranked individual, it also affects the expected benefits from joining such a lottery, as
the probability that one member never receives the pot over a finite period of time is now positive.
Risk aversion may render this unacceptable to some members. An alternative system would be
to allow the pot to grow across periods, so that the first member is now promised a larger pot in
the next cycle. However, given the enforcement conditions expressed above, such a system would
involve a non-stationary pot size, and a contribution amount would exceed a member’s income
after a finite number of cycles. Backward reasoning implies this possibility cannot credibly solve
the enforcement issue.
3.3 Enforcement through membership fee
If roscas are not, by themselves, sustainable, one may wonder whether a monetary entry fee could
solve the problem. Consider that, upon joining a rosca, members must pay a membership fee that
would be lost if they fail to fulfill their obligations. We now argue that such a fee cannot solve the
enforcement problems in fixed roscas. Indeed, in such roscas, the enforcement problem is identical
for all members and keeps repeating itself at each allocation of the pot. As a result, the same fee
must be retained by the rosca throughout the cycle, so as to avoid defection by the member who
receives the pot. As roscas have repeated cycles, the fee must be kept by the rosca throughout
its lifetime to avoid defection also in future cycles.21 This implies that, from the perspective of
rosca members, this fee would essentially be a sunk cost that would never be refunded, whether
the member leaves or stays in the roscas. It would therefore fail to deter defection.
In a random rosca, the fee paid in the first period could be progressively reimbursed throughout
21If the rosca has just one cycle, to deter the first member to defect, the fee should correspond to the net gain
that he would obtain by defecting. As a result, the fee should be almost equal to a pot (deduction made of one
contribution), so that, in the first period, all members should pay an amount equal to a pot (fee+contribution). As
it would have to be paid up-front, it would destroy all incentives to join a rosca.
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the cycle, since enforcement problems are less severe for later ranked members. In particular, since
the last member, after receiving the pot, is in the same situation as when joining a rosca ex ante
(since her ranks in later cycles are unknown), no sanctions are necessary for her to remain in the
rosca in that period. As a result, in a random rosca, the fee can be completely reimbursed at the
end of the cycle, so that the sunk cost argument discussed in the case of fixed roscas no longer
applies. However, even in this case a fee cannot resolve the enforcement problem. Intuitively,
the maximum entry fee a group can impose on a member cannot exceed her expected gains from
joining the group. Such a fee is just high enough to prevent defection from a member who received
an average rank in the cycle, and corresponds to the incentive of this ‘average’ member to stop
contributing. The member who is first to receive the pot becomes an ‘average member’, in expected
terms, only after the first cycle is completed. By leaving immediately, she gains the contributions,
net of the reimbursed fee, that would remain to be paid over the rest of the first cycle.
Proposition 4 The enforcement problem cannot be solved by a membership fee.
Proof in Appendix A
Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that a major factor behind the success of roscas as an
informal financial institution is that they avoid all problems associated with the accumulation of
savings within a group. That advantage would be lost if the rosca had to manage membership fees.
Finally, it may be argued that other characteristics of the rosca may be chosen to address the
enforcement issue, such as the size of the pot, the length of the cycle or the number of members.
Under our modelling assumptions, the size of the pot (which represents the price of one unit of the
indivisible good) is exogenously given. Additionally, as roscas meet once per unit of time, the length
of a cycle is identically equal to the number of members. Ethnographic evidence (from informal
interviews) and the data support this assumption: as rosca members typically receive their income
at regular points in time, they usually contribute to the roscas then to avoid the accumulation
of liquidities at home. This explains why most roscas are organized on a weekly or a monthly
basis.22 Given this, since sR = Pn , there is only one variable left to be chosen by rosca members,
which is either the contribution, sR, or the number of members, n. This number may be chosen
by the rosca so as to further reduce enforcement problems. To do so, membership should be set at
22In our sample, 29.4% of roscas meet weekly, 41.2% meet monthly, and 19.2% meet bi-weekly.
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a level which increases Uk1,f (c,D) or U
k
n,f (c,D) in a fixed rosca, or U
k
1,r(c,D) in a random rosca.
We are unable to obtain clear predictions, however, as much depends on whether the indivisible
good is a complement or a substitute to expenditures on other goods. Additionally, if we relax the
assumption that the number of members is proportional to the length of a cycle, so that the number
of members can be fixed independently, as in Besley et al (1993), the expected utility of a joining
member is strictly increasing in membership: more members indeed imply that each member’s
expected rank diminishes with n and becomes closer to one half.23 Intuitively, an increase in the
number of participating individuals makes the ‘average’ situations more likely compared to the
‘extreme’ (first or last ranks), and thus reduces the expected waiting time. Therefore, enforcement
problems can also be reduced in random roscas by increasing the number of members.
4 An empirical illustration
Our interest on enforcement problems in roscas comes from an intensive field survey we carried out
in 1997 in the slum of Kibera in Nairobi. The survey combined a household survey, a group survey
as well as open interviews with the heads of the groups. A slum like the one we analyze is one of the
best places to study the behavior of informal groups. The inhabitants of the slum are very poor,
with no access to formal insurance or credit institutions. In the absence of state intervention, they
have created a host of informal groups dealing mostly with health insurance, funeral assistance and
saving and credit. Thus, out of the 620 groups we surveyed, 374 are roscas (for more details, see
Anderson and Baland 2002).
Enforcement is a serious concern in roscas, as emphasized by a respondent: “the usual form
of cheating is for a new member to come to a merry-go-round (the local name for a rosca), and
ask for number 1 or 2 because they have an emergency... And then, they stop contributing. (...)
There are many cheaters like that, about half of the population! Some of them are well known!
Still some groups fail due to cheating, but more often because members lack money to contribute.”
Rosca members invest time and resources in addressing enforcement problems. When a member
fails to contribute regularly, groups generally resort to a system of progressive sanctions, usually
preceded by an attempt to establish the reasons for his defaulting. They visit the member at his
23To properly address this issue, a continuous time approach is required. This however complicates considerably
the model, without adding much in content.
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home, or send warning letters. In the absence of a satisfactory reaction, many roscas also attempt
to retrieve the amounts due. For instance, when one member left with the pot, one group went to
the home of the person and appropriated a radio set to compensate for the loss. (In all groups, the
acceptance of new members is subject to them being well-known by the group: “The group knows
where everybody has his house. So, if someone cheats us, group members go to his house and
take away things to repay themselves.”) Ultimately, defecting members may be expelled.24 Groups
sometimes complain to the local police station, with no much effect, but also resort to more diffuse
social threats and pressures. Thus, the chairman of a rosca threatened a defecting member by
writing: “So, you have been given ample time and you have yourself to blame if all goes worse. The
ball is in your pocket!”, and in a later meeting, he reminded members of a deadly Kikuyu curse,
known as ‘kirumi’, which could be used if one squanders others’ money.
More interesting from our perspective is that groups use their organizational design to address
enforcement problem. Thus a group reported the following: “at the beginning, numbers were drawn
by lottery (i.e. random allocation of ranks), to decide who will host the group in her house and get
the pot (...) We dropped the lottery, and the executive committee decides the order. If attendance
was found to be no good, then you will be given a late number.”
Looking to the characteristics of the roscas, we find that the average rosca in our sample is
composed of 16 members and has experienced roughly 9.5 full cycles, which is consistent with our
theoretical assumption of repeated rosca cycles. More interestingly, 71% are fixed roscas and only
29% are random. Comparing these two rocas, we find that random roscas are more likely to be
organized around a single ethnicity and to have been started with friends. In contrast, fixed order
roscas are more heterogenous and are more often started with people from the same neighborhood.
It is possible that social sanctions can more easily be applied on friends and members of the same
tribe, thereby allowing the group to choose a random allocation of the pot. It should be emphasized
that, in accord with our theoretical analysis, a minority of rosca groups have a membership fee. On
average, this up-front fee is only equal to approximately 25% of the monthly contribution, which
is by far too low to deter defection in a random rosca, but is used to cover administrative costs.
As we argued, fixed roscas are better able to solve enforcement problems than random ones.
We therefore expect that individuals who are more vulnerable to social sanctions to be more likely
24In our sample of 374 roscas, 10% have explicitly expelled members.
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to belong to random rather than fixed roscas. Vulnerability to social sanctions should be higher
for individuals who are less mobile, have longer standing social networks in the slum and have
more visible wealth and objects of value. Such individuals are indeed more likely to suffer from
retaliation and reputational effects from the group.
By looking at the characteristics of the 374 members we surveyed, we find systematic differences
between participants to random versus fixed roscas. We can probably relate these to vulnerability
to social sanctions: Members of random roscas are more likely to be: (i) employed as a permanent
worker in the formal sector, have larger households, and own their own dwelling (they are less
mobile); (ii) lived longer in the slum, belong to the Kikuyu tribe (the dominant tribe around
Nairobi), participate to other informal groups and have previously participated to other roscas
(they belong to larger social networks); and (iii) have higher incomes and own more objects of value
such as TV, camera, stereo, radio, clock, etc. (they have more visible wealth). This information is
summarized in Table 1 below.25
No
Rosca
All
Roscas
Fixed
Order
Random
Order
Permanent. work
0.37
(0.48)
0.60
(0.49)
0.53
(0.50)
0.75
(0.43)
Formal sector
0.28
(0.45)
0.19
(0.39)
0.11
(0.31)
0.38
(0.49)
Years in Slum
7.43
(6.37)
8.15
(5.93)
7.86
(5.69)
8.84
(6.45)
Kikuyu
0.21
(0.41)
0.24
(0.43)
0.12
(0.33)
0.52
(0.50)
Household Income
8028.84
(7482.10)
9188.81
(9762.93)
7977.69
(9272.73)
12067.55
(10330.35)
Household Size
4.98
(2.13)
4.86
(2.08)
4.67
(2.05)
5.33
(2.11)
Own room
0.19
(0.39)
0.21
(0.41)
0.10
(0.30)
0.47
(0.50)
No. Objects of Value
4.11
(2.83)
4.43
(2.86)
4.01
(2.43)
5.44
(3.52)
Previous Roscas
0
(0)
0.50
(0.50)
0.39
(0.49)
0.77
(0.42)
Other Group Membership
0.66
(0.47)
0.60
(0.49)
0.56
(0.50)
0.72
(0.45)
Number. Observations 848 374 264 110
Standard errors in brackets, all income variables calculated by month in Kenyan shillings.
25It should be noted that our empirical results remain robust if we exclude roscas in their first cycle (8% of our
sample).
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Table 1:Individual and Household Characteristics.
With the exception of the number of years spent in the slum, all the differences in the charac-
teristics are statistically significant in an equivalence of means test across random and fixed roscas.
We also estimated the probability that an individual participates in a random rosca compared to
a fixed rosca as a function of those characteristics. The results, reported in Appendix B, fully
support the differences highlighted in the descriptive statistics.
It must be noted, before concluding, that the relationship between some of those characteristics
and individual vulnerability can be ambiguous. It is possible that individuals who have a permanent
job in the formal sector are less mobile and more susceptible to retaliation in their work place. But
they are also likely to enjoy better alternative opportunities, so that defection from the group
would be virtually costless. Similarly, to own a house makes the resident less mobile but also
less susceptible to pressure from landlords or neighbors. Or, participation in previous roscas can
be interpreted as a measure of social networks and larger social sanctions. This interpretation
relies on the idea that most of the individuals who have already been members of roscas were not
expelled from those previous groups. Rather the group dissolved voluntarily, for instance because
the amount of regular contributions could no longer be agreed upon. These ambiguities explain
why we were not able to provide more of a proper test of our theoretical results.
5 Conclusion
A key feature of informal groups is that they cannot rely on external enforcement. It is typically
assumed that these groups, such as roscas, rely instead on social sanctions to solve their enforcement
problems. In this paper we examine these notions carefully. By their nature, these groups are set
up beyond the direct reach of the usual instruments of coercion, both political and legal. They are
thus a relatively pure example of self-enforcing informal groups where serious concerns regarding
the possibility of default prevail.
Social sanctions certainly have a role to play. We first demonstrate however that expulsion
from the group is in itself never a sufficient deterrent to default. We then ask whether institutional
features of these groups are chosen in some part to prevent members from defaulting on their
responsibilities. We focus on the allocation of ranks, and we show that a random allocation of
ranks, though preferred by a majority of members, tends to exacerbate enforcement problems.
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They are therefore sustainable only if the costs of social sanctions on their members are sufficiently
high. On the basis of a field survey carried out in Kenya, we then illustrate some of the key
differences in the organizational features of the roscas.
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6 Appendix A: Proof of the Propositions
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
First note that, for the first ranked individual, the enforcement problem occurs once she has received
the first pot. Consider a random rosca. If she stays in the rosca, her expected utility after receiving
the pot, E(Uk1,r(c,D)), is equal to:
E(Uk1,r(c,D)) =
n−1∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) +
∞∑
t=n
δtuk(cR, 0) +
1
n
∞∑
t=n
δt
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
(7)
where the first term on the right hand side represents her utility in the rest of the first cycle,
while the two other terms represent her expected utility from all future cycles. The above can be
rewritten as:
E(Uk1,r(c,D)) =
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δ
1
n
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
(8)
The utility an individual k receives if she defects from the rosca and saves on her own is equal
to Uk(c∗,D∗) − σk. We denote the utility of an individual if she saves sR on her own, without
participating in a rosca by Uknp(c,D), where:
Uknp(c,D) =
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
. (9)
Let the net benefit to staying in a random rosca for the first ranked individual be denoted by ∆k1,r.
Using equations (7) to (9), we have:
∆k1,r = E(U
k
1,r(c,D))− (Uk(c∗,D∗)− σk)
=
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δ
1
n
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uknp(c,D) + Uknp(c,D)− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk
=
[
δn
1− δ
1
n
− δ
n
1− δn
](
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
+
[
Uknp(c,D)− Uk(c∗,D∗)
]
+ σk (10)
< 0, if σk = 0
The first bracketed term is negative as long as 11−δ < n
1
1−δn , which is always the case for n > 1.
This term represents the net discounted value from consuming the indivisible good earlier by saving
on her own rather than in a rosca. It is negative because the individual must wait at least until the
beginning of a new cycle before having a chance at receiving the pot and buying an additional unit
of the indivisible good. In contrast, by saving the same amount on her own, she is guaranteed to
receive the indivisible good at the beginning of each new cycle. The second term in (10) represents
the difference in utility between saving in a rosca and saving optimally at home. This term is
negative because optimal savings, with discounting, are typically non-constant, whereas roscas
impose a constant saving rate.
Consider now the net benefit from staying in a fixed rosca for the first ranked individual, ∆k1,f .
Let Uk1,f (c,D) denote the utility of the first ranked member of saving in a fixed rosca, after receiving
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the pot:
Uk1,f (c,D) =
n−1∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) +
∞∑
t=n
δtuk(cR, 0) +
∞∑
k=1
δkn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
=
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
(11)
Using (11), we have:
∆k1,f = U
k
1,f (c,D)−
(
Uk(c∗,D∗)− σk
)
=
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uknp(c,D) + Uknp(c,D)− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk
= Uknp(c,D)− Uk(c∗,D∗) < 0, if σk = 0 (12)
In the absence of social sanctions, the difference in utility between staying in a fixed rosca or saving
on one’s own is that the rosca imposes a sub-optimal constant saving pattern, cR, instead of c∗t .
Otherwise, in a fixed rosca, the first ranked member is assured to receive the pot first in all future
cycles. Hence, by saving the same amount on her own, she receives additional units of the indivisible
good at the same time. 
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider first fixed roscas and let the utility of the last-ranked member be denoted by Ukn,f (c,D).
Her net benefit to staying in a fixed rosca, ∆kn,f , is equal to:
∆kn,f = U
k
n,f (c,D)−
(
Uk(c∗,D∗)− σk
)
=
( ∞∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) +
∞∑
v=1
δvn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk
=
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk (13)
= ∆k1,f
where k = i,H. This follows because, after receiving the pot in a fixed rosca, all members must
wait exactly one full cycle before receiving their next pot. In other words, the enforcement problem
is the same for all ranked members with similar vulnerability to social sanctions, σk.
This is not so for random roscas. Indeed, in this case, the member who receives the last rank
in the first cycle can expect an earlier rank in the future. More formally, her expected utility if she
stays in the rosca, E(Ukn,r(c,D)), is equal to:
E(Ukn,r(c,D)) =
(
n∑
t=1
δtuk(cR, 0) + δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
+
( ∞∑
t=n+1
δtuk(cR, 0) +
1
n
∞∑
t=n+1
δt
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
(14)
23
where the first term in brackets represents her utility in the first cycle and the second term is her
expected utility in all future cycles. Using (14), the net benefit to staying in a random rosca, ∆kn,r
is:
∆kn,r = E(U
k
n,r(c,D))− (Uk(c∗,D∗)− σk)
=
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
(
δn +
δn+1
1− δ
1
n
)(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk (15)
In contrast to the first ranked member, the expected net benefit for the last ranked member in a
random rosca may be positive. In particular, if her utility function is such that the optimal savings
pattern is almost identical to that in the rosca, then, using (15), ∆kn,r becomes:
∆kn,r '
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) + (δn +
δn+1
1− δ
1
n
)
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
−
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
δn
1− δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
+ σk (16)
'
(
δn +
δn+1
1− δ
1
n
− δ
n
1− δn
)(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
+ σk > 0 even for σk = 0.
This expression is positive since staying in the rosca allows the member to receive the indivisible
good earlier in future cycles, where she is likely to receive more favorable ranks.
Using (10) and (16), we also have:
∆kn,r =
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
(
δn +
δn+1
1− δ
1
n
)(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk
=
(
δ
1− δu
k(cR, 0) +
(
(n− 1)
n
δn +
δn
n
+
δn+1
1− δ
1
n
)(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
))
− Uk(c∗,D∗) + σk
=
(n− 1)
n
δn
(
uk(cR, 1)− uk(cR, 0)
)
+∆k1,r
Comparing equations (10) and (16), we get for the random rosca that the benefits to stay in the
rosca are higher for the last rank member than for the first ranked member:
∆kn,r > ∆
k
1,r
For the fixed rosca, using equations (12) and (13), we obtain that the benefits to stay are the
same across ranks:
∆kn,f = ∆
k
1,f = ∆
k
l,f ∀l
To compare the two types of roscas, we can therefore restrict our attention to the the incentives
for the first-ranked individual to remain in the rosca. Comparing equations (10) and (12), we get:
∆k1,f > ∆
k
1,r
Hence, the results stated under Proposition 3.
24
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We show here that no fee exists that can solve the enforcement problem in a random rosca. We
focus on the first ranked individual, and consider a situation under which a fee is paid in the first
period of each cycle, and reimbursed afterwards within the cycle so as to maximize the incentives
of the first ranked individual to stay in the rosca. If fees have also to be paid in later periods within
the cycle, this can only increase her incentives to leave. Moreover, as we have already argued in
the case of fixed order roscas, the fee should be completely reimbursed at the end of the cycle.
Otherwise, it is analogous to a sunk cost that is never reimbursed, so that it has no impact on the
enforcement constraint.
We let f1 stand for the fee paid in the first period, and ft for the amount reimbursed to a
member in period t. The budget constraint implies that:
∑n
t=1 ft = 0. The expected utility of a
member joining a rosca with a fee can be written as:
E(Uk(Fee)) =
(
n∑
t=1
δtuk(cR + ft, 0) +
1
n
δt
(
uk(cR + ft, 1)− uk(cR + ft, 0)
))
+δn+1E(Uk(Fee))
where the first bracketed term is the explicit expression of the expected utility of a member in the
first cycle. We first note that, to offer to the first ranked members the best incentives to stay, it
must be true that f1 < 0 and ft ≥ 0 for t = 2, ...n. To maximize this incentive, we are looking for
the highest fee that can be imposed while still preserving members’ incentives to join the rosca. As
such a fee reduces the expected utility of members, we therefore require that the rosca, with this
maximal membership fee, yields an ex ante utility which is equal to the utility a member enjoys by
saving on his own. We therefore have:
E(Uk(Fee)) = Uk(c∗,D∗) (17)
Note that for the above equality to hold, then it must be true the fee is strictly smaller than the
pot, since otherwise, there are no net gains that can be expected from the rosca (as the pot is then
bought by everyone in the first period): f1 < P .
Let us now turn to the utility the first ranked individual obtains by leaving once she receives
the pot. If she leaves, she saves on her own, and therefore her expected future utility in period 1
is equal to Uk(c∗,D∗). Optimality implies:
Uk(c∗,D∗) >
n−1∑
t=1
δtuk(y, 0) + δnUk(c∗,D∗). (18)
Using (17), we obtain:
Uk(c∗,D∗) >
n−1∑
t=1
δtuk(y, 0) + δnE(Uk(Fee). (19)
If a member stays in the rosca, she must still save in net over the periods 2 to n, since the fee is
strictly smaller than the pot. Moreover, the reimbursement is made so as to maximize their utility
from period 2 onwards (to increase the incentive to stay for the first member), so that savings will
be positive (and increasing) over the remaining cycle: cR + ft < y for t = 2, ...n. As a result,
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n−1∑
t=1
δtuk(y, 0) + δnE(Uk(Fee) >
n−1∑
t=1
δtuk(cR + fi, 0) + δnE(Uk(Fee)) (20)
Inequalities (19) and (20) imply that, in the absence of social sanctions, the first member is always
better off by leaving once she receives the pot, even at the cost of loosing her membership fee.
7 Appendix B: Two-step estimation of individual participation
We estimate the probability that an individual participates in a random rosca compared to a fixed
rosca as a function of his characteristics, using a Heckman two-step estimation procedure. In the
first stage, we follow Anderson and Baland (2002) and estimate the probability that an individual
joins a rosca as a function of individual characteristics, using gender, marital status, and female
household bargaining power as instruments. In the second stage, we estimate the probability an
individual selects into a random rosca, as a function of characteristics related to their vulnerability
to social sanctions. The table below summarize our second stage results from estimating the
probability of joining a random rosca compared to a fixed rosca.
Random
(1)
Random
(2)
Random
(3)
Random
(4)
Age -0.014 (0.008) -0.011 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.016 (0.011)
At least Primary -0.22 (0.15) -0.34 (0.17)** 0.05 (0.16) -0.14 (0.18)
Household Income 1.4e-5 (8.6e-6)* 1.6e-5 (6.5e-6)** 1.4e-5 (6.9e-6)** 1.6e-5 (8.3e-6)
Household Size 0.045 (0.038) 0.066 (0.038)* 0.11 (0.04)*** 0.12 (0.04)***
≤ 1 yrs in kibera -0.24 (0.31) -0.15 (0.32)
Kikuyu 1.07 (0.17)*** 0.74 (0.19)***
Permanent Employment 0.38 (0.16)** 0.28 (0.17)*
Formal Sector 0.77 (0.21)*** 0.65 (0.22)***
Own room 1.10 (0.18)*** 0.70 (0.21)***
No. Objects of Value 0.08 (0.03)*** -0.03 (0.04)
Previous Roscas 0.95 (0.16)*** 0.85 (0.16)***
Group Membership 0.27 (0.17)** 0.19 (0.17)
Constant -2.79 (0.65)*** -1.39 (0.40)*** -2.26 (0.43)*** -2.05 (0.45)***
Log likelihood -733.47 -700.62 -691.39 -679.03
No. Obs 373 373 373 373
Table 2 - Estimations of whether individual select into random or fixed order roscas26
26The results are from a maximum-likelihood probit estimation with sample selection. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and a triple for 1%.
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